This paper is divided into two sections. In the first I give reasons for strongly recommending reading some of Henkin's expository papers. In the second I describe Leon Henkin's work as a social activists in the field of mathematics education, as he labored in much of his career to boost the number of women and underrepresented minorities in the upper echelons of mathematics.
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Some of Henkin's expository papers
Henkin was an extraordinary insightful professor with a talent for exposition, and he devoted considerable effort to writing expository papers. I will mention three of them, while trying to convince you to read them with your students as a source of mutual inspiration.
Are Logic and Mathematics Identical?
This is the title of a wonderful expository paper [5] , which Leon Henkin published in Science in 1962, and subtitled: An old thesis of Russell's is reexamined in the light of subsequent developments in mathematical logic. I recommend that you to give this paper to your students, not only because the historical view provided is comprehensive and synthetic but also because it shows the Henkin's characteristic style; namely, the ability to strongly catch your attention from the start.
How does he achieve it? you might wonder. In that particular paper, Henkin tells us that his interest in logic began at the age of 16, when '(I) came across a little volume of Bertrand Russell entitled Mysticism and Logic'. In the introduction Henkin cites Russell's radical thesis, that 'mathematics was nothing but logic' together with the companion thesis ' that logic is purely tautological', and he describes the strong reaction against his thesis by the academic community: 'Aux armes, citoyens du monde mathématique! ' Henkin then devotes the first section of the paper to explain the two main ideas that could help explain how Russell arrived at his conclusion. The first was the lengthy effort to achieve a 'systematic reduction of all concepts of mathematics to a small number of them', and the second was 'the systematic study by mathematical means of the laws of logic which entered into mathematical proofs'. Henkin relates the work of Frege, Peirce, Boole and Schröder, during the second half of the nineteenth century, with the two efforts mentioned above, and identifies them as the primary raison d'etre of Principia Mathematica.
In Henkin was awarded the Chauvenet Prize in 1964 for this paper. The prize is described as a Mathematical Association of America award to the author of an outstanding expository article on a mathematical topic by a member of the Association.
Bertrand Russell's request
In April 1, 1963, Henkin received a very interesting letter from Bertrand Russell. In it, Russell thanked Henkin for 'your letter of March 26 and for the very interesting paper which you enclosed.' Right at the beginning Russell declared:
It is fifty years since I worked seriously at mathematical logic and almost the only work that I have read since that date is Gödel's. I realized, of course, that Gödel's work is of fundamental importance, but I was pussled by it. It made me glad that I was no longer working at mathematical logic. If a given set of axioms leads to a contradiction, it is clear that at least one of the axioms is false. Does this apply to school-boys' arithmetic, and if so, can we believe anything that we were taught in youth? Are we to think that 2+2 is not 4, but 4 
On Mathematical Induction
In a personal communication Henkin affirmed that On mathematical induction [4] , published in 1960, was the favorite among his articles because it had a somewhat panoramic nature and was not directed exclusively to specialists. He wrote: '[...] but my little paper on induction models from 1960, which has always been my favorite among my expository papers'. In it, the relationship between the induction axiom and recursive definitions is studied in depth.
Why do I so strongly recommend that you ask your students to read this paper? From my point of view, it is the best paper on logic to offer students as a first reading of a "real-life" article. The paper is especially interesting because Henkin describes something that would never appear in a formal article: his motivation. It seems that Henkin was trying to convince a mathematical colleague about why a given argument about the existence of recursive operations was completely wrong, even though at first sight it might seem convincing.
Before going into the details of the wrong argument that motivated the whole paper, Henkin explains Peano arithmetic.
Peano axiomatized the theory of natural numbers. To do so, he started out from indefinable primitive terms -in particular, those of natural number, zero, and the successor function--and by means of three axioms he synthesized the main facts. Among those axioms is that of induction, which states that any subset of natural numbers, closed by the successor operation and to which zero belongs, is precisely the set of all natural numbers. Although the axioms for the theory of natural numbers are very important, the most interesting theorems of the theory did not stem from them alone because in most of the theorems, operations of addition, multiplication, etc. are used.
Peano thought that after axiomatizing a theory it did not suffice to organize the facts by means of axiomatic laws; it was also necessary to organize the concepts, using definition laws. In particular, we can define addition recursively by means of:
However, this definition must be justified by a theorem in which the existence of a unique operation that will satisfy the previous equations must be established.
A poor argument to prove this is as follows. Let us choose any x ∈ N. We define a subset G of N, by placing all y ∈ N elements in G for which x + y is defined by the previous equations. It is not difficult to see that 0 ∈ G and that ∀(y ∈ G → Sy ∈ G). Now using the induction axiom, we conclude that G = N and thus that x + y is defined for all y ∈ N.
Why is this proof wrong? This was the question that Henkin's colleague posed him. Henkin tried to convince him that because the argument was designed to establish the existence of a function f (+ in the example), it is incorrect to assume in the course of the argument that we have such a function. Henkin made him see that in the proof only the third axiom was used and that, if correct, the same reasoning could be used not only for models that satisfy all Peano axioms but also for those that satisfy only the induction one. Henkin called these "Induction Models" and proved that in them not all recursive operations are definable. For example, exponentiation fails.
Induction models turn out to have a fairly simple mathematical structure: there are standard ones -that is, isomorphic to natural numbers-but also non-standard ones. The latter also have a simple structure: either they are cycles, in particular Z modulo n, or they are what Henkin calls "spoons" because they have a handle followed by a cycle. The reason is that the induction axiom is never fulfilled alone, since it requires Peano's first or second axiom. This does not mean that Peano's axioms are redundant, as it is well known that they are formally independent; i.e., each one is independent of the other two.
Completeness
If you take a look at the list of documents Leon Henkin left us, the first published paper, The completeness of first order logic [2] , corresponds to his well known result, while the last, The discovery of my completeness proof [7] , is a extremely interesting as autobiography, thus ending his career with a sort of fascinating loop.
I claim that reading the last paper is a must. Why? As you know, Leon Henkin left us an important collection of papers, some of them so exciting as his proof of the completeness theorem both for the theory of types and for first-order logic. He did so by means of an innovative and highly versatile method, which was later to be used in many other logics, even in those known as non-classical. In his 1996 paper, we learn about the process of discovery, which observed facts he was trying to explain, and why he ended up discovering things that were not originally the target of his enquiries. Thus, in this case we do not have to engage in risky hypotheses or explain his ideas on the mere basis of the later, cold elaboration in scientific articles. It is well known that the logic of discovery differs from what is adopted on organizing the final exposition of our research through their different propositions, lemmas, theorems and corollaries.
We also learn that the publication order of his completeness results ( [2] and [3] ) is the reverse of his discovery of the proofs. The completeness for first-order logic was accomplished when he realized he could modify the proof obtained for type theory in an appropriate way. We consider this to be of great significance, because the effort of abstraction needed for the first proof (that of type theory) provided a broad perspective that allowed him to see beyond some prejudices and to make the decisive changes needed to reach his second proof. In [9] you can find a detailed commentary of Henkin's contribution to the resolution and understanding of the completeness phenomena.
Henkin's expository papers on completeness
In 1967 Henkin published two very relevant expository papers on for the subject we are considering here, Truth and Provability and Completeness, which were published in Philosophy of Science Today [10] .
Truth and Provability
In less than 10 pages, Henkin gives a very intuitive introduction to the concept of truth and its counterpart, that of provability, in the same spirit of Tarski's expository paper Truth and Proof [11] . The latter was published in Scientific American two years after Henkin's contribution. This not so surprising as Henkin had by then been in Berkeley working with Tarski for about 15 years and the theory of truth was Tarski's contribution.
The main topics Henkin introduces (or at least touches upon) are very relevant. They include the use/mention distinction, the desire for languages with infinite sentences and the need for a recursive definition of truth, the language/metalanguage distinction, the need to avoid reflexive paradoxes, the concept of denotation for terms, and the interpretation of quantified formulas. He also explains what an axiomatic theory is and how it works in harmony with a deductive calculus. Properties such as decidability and completeness/incompleteness of a theory are mentioned at the end. I admire the way these concepts are introduced, with such élan, and the chain Henkin establishes, which shows how each concept is needed to support the next.
Completeness
In this short expository paper Henkin explores the complex landscape of the notions of completeness. He introduces the notion of logical completeness -both weak and strongas an extension of the notion already introduced of "completeness of an axiomatic theory". This presentation differs notably from the standard way these notions are introduced today where, usually, the completeness of the logic precedes the notion of completeness of a theory and, often, to avoid misunderstandings, both concepts are separated as much as possible, as if relating them were some sort of terrible mistake or even anathema. Gödel's incompleteness theorem is presented, as well as its negative impact on the search for a complete calculus for higher-order logic. The paper ends by introducting his own completeness result for higher-order logic with general semantics. The utilitarian way Henkin uses to justify his general models as a way of sorting the provable sentences from the unprovable ones in the class of valid sentences (in standard models) is very peculiar.
The Roles of Action and Thought in Mathematics Education
Henkin was often described as a social activist, he labored much of his career to boost the number of woman and underrepresented minorities in the upper echelons of mathematics. He was also very aware that we are beings immersed in the crucible of history from which we find it hard to escape, an awareness he brought to the very beginning of his interesting article about the teaching of mathematics [6] :
Waves of history wash over our nation, stirring up our society and our institutions.
Soon we see changes in the way that all of us do things, including our mathematics and our teaching. These changes form themselves into rivulets and streams that merge at various angles with those arising in parts of our society quite different from education, mathematics, or science. Rivers are formed, contributing powerful currents that will produce future waves of history. In this paper he gave both a short outline of the variety of educational programs he created and/or participated in, and interesting details about some of them. In particular he discussed the following six: In 1957, Henkin involved himself in several NSF's programs, he served as a lecturer of several courses. These programs were designed to improve high school and college mathematics instruction and were directed to mathematics teachers. Henkin explained that the variety of attitudes toward mathematics of the teachers attending the courses was amazing, and that the experience gave him a view of the nature of instruction around the country. The subject of his courses was the axiomatic foundation of number systems. One of his aims was to get students to understand "the idea of a proof" because he believed that it could help students in the effort of finding proofs of their own, in a much better way than the mere understanding of the steps that constitutes a proof. The committee recruited promising students and offered them summer programs to study mathematics and English. If they persisted in the program, they were offered special scholarships.
In the same year, 1964, Henkin heard a talk by a Berkeley High School teacher, Bill Johntz. After that, Henkin was invited to see him in action, while he was teaching mathematics to elementary students from low-income neighborhoods, and realized that Johntz was able to raise great enthusiasm in the class. Significantly, students enjoyed and actively engaged in the process of learning, and they became integrally involved in their own education. He was using a Socratic group-discovery method modeled after the filmed teaching of David Page, a University of Illinois mathematics professor. The method was working well, and they recruited university mathematics students as well as engineers as teachers, after some training. 
